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Recent tax reform discussions have centered around two major areas of concern:
first, the income base subject to the income tax, and, second, the rate at which income
should be taxed." As an alternative to the present income base definition, some
proponents of reform have suggested a "broader" base that closely approximates the
Haig-Simons definition of income.2 This approach involves the inclusion in the
base of some presently excluded income items such as interest on state and local
bonds, gifts, bequests, devises and inheritances, and so forth; the recognition of
appreciation and depreciation in the values of property as income subject to tax;
and, finally, the addition to the base of items of imputed income attributable to
property ownership or service-yielding assets (for example, imputed rent on owner-
occupied houses).
With respect to the rate structure, however, little agreement exists among tax
reform advocates on the proper rate structure or how the present rate structure might
be modified. Galvin, Ture, and Stockfisch3 have suggested the substitution of a flat
(proportionate) income tax rate for the existing "progressive" rate structure. A flat
rate would eliminate distortion caused by progression, eliminate the need for relief
measures for those taxpayers subject to higher rates, eliminate the bunching problem,
and lead to simplification of the tax code. These arguments and the fact that rate
progression cannot be justified on a sound "theoretical" basis make a flat rate
structure appealing. However, such a proposal must also be evaluated in terms
of the differential incidence of this tax system as opposed to the present one-that is,
how many gain and how many lose by the substitution, and how the gainers and
losers are distributed by income class.
The purpose of this paper is to present empirical evidence on the distribution of
*The authors are, respectively, Associate Professor of Economics, Clark University; Professor of Eco-
nomics, Clark University; and Assistant Professor of Management, Oklahoma State University. The authors
would like to acknowledge the assistance and the free computer service provided for them at Oklahoma
State University. Research in the area was made possible by a grant from the Fund for Public Policy
Research.
" C. GALVIN & B. BrrrITER, Tim INCOME TAX: How PROGRESSIVE SHOULD IT BE? (I969).
'Musgrave, In Defense of an Income Concept, 8I HARv. L. REV. 44 (1967); Pechman, Comprehensive
Income Taxation: A Comment, 8i H v. L. REV. 63 (1967); Galvin, More on Boris Bittker and the
Comprehensive Tax Base: The Practicalities of Tax Reform and the ABA's CSTR, 81 HA v. L. REv. ioi6
(1968); Bittker, A 'Comprehensive Tax Base' as a Goal of Income Tax Reform, 8o HAxv. L. Rav. 925
(s967).
' Galvin, supra note 2, at Ioig; Ture, The Rate Structure of the Income Tax, FEDERAL. TAX CHANGES
FOR THE Ftrrnm, especially r6-i9 (1970); Statement of J.A. Stockfisch, Hearings on Tax Reform Before
the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 9st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 12, at 4453-54 (969).
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the tax burden that results from three hypothetical tax systems which involve the
broadening of the federal personal income tax base and substitution of a "flat" tax
rate structure, or, alternatively, a mildly progressive rate structure, for the rate
schedule in effect prior to the 1969 Tax Reform Act. In Section I an outline of the
"broad" base and the rate structures used in the study is given. Section II summarizes
the methodology used in the estimates. The major findings of the study are high-
lighted in Section III, and some implications for tax reform discussions are then
indicated in Section IV.
I
THE INcoME BASE AND RATE STRucTuRE
The "broad" income tax base considered in this study is defined as the income
generated through private market transactions or which would be generated through
private market transactions. This includes factor income (cash and in kind),
private transfer payments, and changes in net values of assets. In other words,
starting with adjusted gross income (AGI), net of realized capital gains, as the
base, we then include excluded factor incomes such as interest on state and local
bonds, imputed rent, sick pay, and interest on life insurance cash surrender values;
private transfers such as profit sharing and employers' contributions to retirement
plans; and all gains on capital assets.
Given the "broad" tax base defined above, we then develop three alternative
systems yielding the 1966 personal tax revenue (taxes before credits). Two of these
use a flat rate structure, while the third is a simplified progressive rate structure with
a maximum rate bracket of forty per cent. Alternative A differs from the present
personal income tax system (1966 tax law) in that it (i) allows $6oo exemptions for
taxpayers and their dependents but no old age or blind exemptions and (2) disallows
itemized deductions but provides a liberalization of the standard deduction."
In Alternative B, the ten per cent standard deduction is replaced by a "low income
allowance' 'T and "percentage standard deduction" set forth for x973 and after in
the 1969 Tax Reform Act. The allowable personal exemption is raised to $625 instead
of $6oo. The percentage standard deduction allows a deduction of fifteen per cent
up to a maximum of $2o00, and the low income allowance is equal to the sum of
the basic allowance plus the additional allowances. The basic allowance is an
amount equal to the sum of $200 plus the number of exemptions multiplied by $xoo.
However, the basic allowance cannot exceed $Sooo. The additional allowance is an
'Pub. L. No. 91-172 (Dec. 30, 1969).
' This definition excludes nonprivate (government) nonmarket transactions such as government trans-
fer payments. Government transfer payments are simply another tool used to redistribute income
and thus should be considered within the context of a tax-transfer system.
a o% of income, up to a maximum of $2,000.
"The low income allowance chosen here is the one in the Tax Reform Act of 1969, effective for
1970. See Tax Reform Act of 1969, § 802.
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amount equal to the excess (if any) of $900 over the sum of $ioo, multiplied by
the number of exemptions, plus the income phase-out, which is an amount equal to
one-half of the amount by which the adjusted gross income exceeds $i,ioo plus $625
multiplied by the number of exemptions. The low income allowance is used whenever
it exceeds the percentage deduction.
Alternative C involves the same tax base as Alternative B but replaces the flat rate
with a graduated rate up to forty per cent. The amount of the 1966 tax revenues
were also generated under this alternative.
HI
DATA AND GENERAL METHODOLOGY
The basic data sources used in this study are the Treasury Department's 1966 Tax
File Subsample (Tax File), a stratified sample of some 30,000 individual income
tax returns; the Office of Economic Opportunity's 1967 Survey of Economic Oppor-
tunity (SEO); and the Federal Reserve Board's 1963 Survey of Financial Character-
istics of Consumers (Fed Sample). The Tax File provided our 1966 tax model, to
which we have imputed certain income items that are wholly or partially excluded
from the present income tax base. The SEO and Fed Sample provided the necessary
information for making many of the needed income imputations to broaden the
income tax base.
Before the imputations could be made, however, we had to deal with two im-
portant problems. First, we had to sort out nonfilers (nontaxpaying families and
unrelated individuals) from the SEO. Second, the Tax File had to be put on a
family rather than a taxpayer basis. These steps were essential to make the two
samples as comparable as possible
The procedure followed in imputing to the Tax File an income item was as
follows: (I) ascertaining the aggregate amount of income to be added to the present
tax base; (2) using the SEO or Fed Sample to allocate it by income, class; (3) deter-
mining the conditional probability that any tax return would have the income being
imputed; and (4) imputing it. The tax model was then used to estimate the distri-
butional consequences of alternative tax systems A and B as compared to the
existing system.
III
SUMMARY OF MAJOR FINDINGS
A. Alternative A
Under Alternative A, the addition to AGI (less realized capital gains) of seven
income items excluded under [966 tax law, adds $ii6 billion to the tax base. The
" The methodologies used are similar to those followed in Ott & Ott, Simulation of Revenue and Tax
Structure Implications of Broadening the Federal Income Tax Base, in STUDIES IN SUBSrANnVE TAx
REFORM 27-io6 (A. \Willis ed. 1969).
' The personal income tax base in 1966 was raised from $287 billion to $4o3 billion. The items added
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bulk of the gain in the tax base (eighty-five per cent) comes from three sources-
capital gains, imputed rent, and replacement of itemized deductions with the stan-
dard deduction. Since personal income tax revenues (before the credits) in 1966
were $58 billion, the broader tax base made it possible to raise these 1966 revenues
with a flat tax rate of 144 per cent.
The distribution pattern that resulted from the substitution of Alternative A
for the existing base and rate structure is shown in Tables I through 3. Table x
shows by income class' ° the number of returns filed in 1966 which would incur a
TABLE I
DISTRIBUTION OF RETURNS WITH INCREASED TAX LIABILITY UNDER ALTERNATIvE A,
BROAD TAx BASE AND A FLAT TAx RATE OF 14.4 PER CENT
(Thousands)
Number of Returns Whose Tax Liability Is S Average
Increased by: Total Tax
Number Increase
of per
Income Class S 0-1% 1-5% 5-10% 10-20% 201o-ON Returns Return
0-600 ................... 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
600-1500 ................ 0 38 12 12 5351 5413 31
1500-3000 ............... 127 522 552 1273 5011 7485 69
3000-5000 ............... 190 577 418 735 4994 6914 115
5000-7000 ............... 163 758 803 1174 3816 6719 142
7000-10000 .............. 301 1227 1199 1619 4058 8404 161
10000-15000 ............. 124 844 848 1092 1860 4858 217
15000-20000 ............. 56 233 180 281 390 1140 329
20000-25000 ............. 20 94 62 108 163 447 445
25000-50000 ............. 14 45 55 92 167 373 863
50000-100000 ............ 2 1 2 11 19 35 2280
100000-ON .............. 1 8 10 29 97 145 15165
TOTAL ................ 1093 4347 4141 6426 25920 41933 191
Increase in Tax Revenue from These R3turns=S8,015,305,000
larger tax liability and the average dollar increase in tax liability. For example,
390,000 returns (thirty-four per cent of the total with income between $i5,ooo and
$20,000) would have an increase in personal tax liability under Alternative A of
twenty per cent or more. The average dollar increase in tax liability for these returns
is $329. The total number of returns with increased tax liabilities is 41.9 million, and
the average dollar increase in tax liability for these returns is $191.
Table 2 gives the same type of information as Table I for returns with decreased
tax liabilities. The total number of returns with decreased tax liability using Alterna-
tive A is 28.2 million and the average dollar decrease in tax liability per return is
$284.11
to the base were the following: (i) interest on state and local bonds; (2) employers' contributions
to retirement plans; (3) profit sharing; (4) imputed rent on owners' occupied homes; (5) intcrcst on
life insurance surrender value; (6) sick pay; and (7) accrued capital gains on corporate stock.
1 0 Income includes the imputed income items required to broaden the tax base.
1 1 Note that the flat rate of 14.4% was chosen in such a way that the increased tax liability would equal
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From Tables i and 2 it is clear that if Alternative A had replaced the 1966 tax
code in 1966, eleven per cent of all returns would have had a tax change between
minus one per cent and plus one per cent, twenty-four per cent of the returns would
have a tax change between minus twenty per cent and plus twenty per cent, and
forty-four per cent would either pay more or less than twenty per cent of what they
were currently paying.
TABLE 2
DISTRIBUTION OF RETURNS WITH DECREASED TAX LIABILITY UNDER ALTERNATIVE A,
BROAD TAx BASE AND A FIAT RATE OF 14.4 PER CENT
(Thousands)
Number of Returns Whose Tax Liability Is 8 Average
Decreased by: Total Tax
Number Decrease
of per
Income Class S 0-1% 1-5% 5-10% 10-20% 20'o-ON Returns Return
0-600 ................... 3782 0 0 0 0 3782 0
600-1500 ................ 1378 0 0 0 0 1378 0
1500-3000 ............... 65 409 375 12 1115 1976 6
3000-5000 ............... 135 969 751 1744 304 3903 41
5000-7000 ............... 148 834 1017 872 224 3095 65
7000-10000 .............. 313 1461 1467 1585 385 5211 99
10000-15000 ............. 214 1013 1495 1918 615 5255 179
15000-20000 ............. 49 263 392 667 382 1753 326
20000-25000 ............. 12 84 134 291 239 760 568
25000-50000 ............. 21 63 119 234 439 876 1392
50000-100000 ............ 1 5 9 24 134 173 4249
100000-ON .............. 2 6 8 13 38 118 27576
TOTAL ................. 6120 5107 5767 7360 3926 28280 284
Decrease in Tax Revenue from These Returns = $8,031,520,000
A comparison of the number of returns with increased tax liability (losers) with
the number of returns with decreased tax liability (gainers) is shown in Table 3.
The fourth column in the table gives the net number of returns with increased
taxes. A negative figure in that column indicates that there are more returns in the
income class with decreased taxes than there are with increased taxes. As Table
3 indicates, returns with increased tax liabilities outnumber those with decreased tax
liabilities for income classes between $6oo and $1o,ooo, and for the income class
of $ioo,ooo and on. Furthermore, some sixty-nine per cent of all returns with in-
comes between N6oo and $ioooo would pay more taxes using Alternative A than
they would pay under the 1966 tax code, and approximately forty-four per cent of
the returns with incomes over $o,ooo would pay more taxes using Alternative A.
Out of all returns, sixty per cent would have a larger tax liability and forty per cent
the decreased tax liability. The increase in tax is given by (41,933,000) X (Siis) - 8,o5 million and
the decrease in tax is given by (23,280,000) X ($284) = $8,032 million. The $17 million discrepancy is
due to rounding off of the flat rate and to the fact that the data set is not perfectly uniform in its com-
position of returns.
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TABLE 3
COMPARISON OF RETUI NS WITH AN INCREASED TAX LIABILITY WITH THOSE WITH A
REDucED TAX LIARIuT UNDER ALTERNATIvE A
Excess of Returns
Number of Returns (Thousands) with Increased Taxes
over Returns with
with with Reduced Taxes
Income Class $ Increased Taxes Reduced Taxes (Thousands)
0-600 ........................ 0 3782 -3782
600-1500 ..................... 5413 1378 4035
1500-3000 .................... 7485 1976 5509
3000-5000 .................... 6914 3903 3011
5000-7000 .................... 6719 3095 3624
7000-10000 ................... 8404 5211 3193
1000-15000 ................... 4858 5255 -397
15000-20000 .................. 1140 1753 -613
20000-25000 .................. 447 760 -313
25000-50000 .................. 373 876 -503
50000-100000 ................. 35 173 -138
100000-ON ................... 145 118 27
TOTAL ..................... 41933 28280 13635
would have a reduced tax liability. Increased net tax payments for returns with
incomes below $io,ooo would generate an additional $2.9 billion; returns with
incomes greater than $io,ooo would have a net reduction in tax liability of $2.9
billion.
In short, Alternative A clearly benefits some individuals and families with incomes
in excess of $ioooo at the expense of some of those individuals and families with
incomes below $Ioooo. The explanation for this result is that individuals and
families with incomes less than $ioooo paid less than 144 per cent of their "broad"
taxable income in 1966, whereas those persons and families with incomes in excess
of $ioooo paid, on the average, more than 14.4 per cent of their "broad" taxable
incomes.
B. Alternative B
Under Alternative B the tax base increased from $287 billion, in 1966, to $376
billion.P The flat income tax rate required to generate 1966 tax revenues (before
credit) is 15.4 per cent. The distributional effects of Alternative B-whose tax
liability increased, and whose decreased-are shown in Tables 4 and 5. Table 6
summarizes the net distributional pattern.
Approximately 41.7 million returns would have a decreased tax liability if
Alternative B were used in place of the 1966 tax code. Of this total, 4.9 million
returns would have had a decrease of less than one per cent. The average dollar
decrease in tax liability per return would have been $i86. If those returns with a
12 The increase in the base is only $89 billion as compared to Sxx6 billion under Alternative A. This
is due to the increased level of personal exemption, a higher standard deduction, and the low income
allowance allowed under Alternative B.
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TABLE 4
DisTm uTIo o F RETURNS wir DECREASED TAX LIABiLiTy UNDER ALTERNATIVE B,
BROAD TAX BASE AND A FLAT RATE OF 15.4 PER CENT
(Thousands)
Number of Returns Whose Tax Liability Is $ Average
Decreased by: Total Tax
Number Decrease
of per
Income Class $ 0-1% 1-5% 5-10% 10-20% 20%-ON Returns Return
0-600 ................... 3782 0 0 0 0 3782 0
600-1500 ................ 0 0 0 0 6792 6792 16
1500-3000 ............... 0 49 135 716 7217 8117 48
3000-5000 ............... 139 1008 0139 1999 1708 5893 36
5000-7000 ............... 186 697 1119 811 410 3223 60
7000-10000 .............. 443 1371 1594 1653 345 5406 93
10000-15000 ............. 273 1007 1549 1888 556 5273 172
15000-20000 ............. 66 274 425 575 242 1582 292
20000-25000 ............. 33 104 136 255 113 641 484
25000-50000 ............. 20 89 119 218 309 755 1272
50000-100000 ............ 0 9 15 14 125 163 3941
100000-ON .............. 2 5 5 12 83 107 28902
TOTAL ................ 4944 4613 6136 8141 17900 41734 186
Decrease in Tax Revenue from These Returns=S7,762,000,000
decrease of less than one per cent are excluded, the average dollar decrease in tax
liability per return is $211.
Some 28.5 million returns would have incurred an increased tax liability with
an average dollar increase per return of $272.13
Table 6 gives the profile of the percentage change in the tax liability which would
have occurred in 1966 if Alternative B had replaced the existing code. These
changes are given by income classes, and the calculations were made using the data
in Tables 4 and 5.
Observing the bottom, or "total" row in Table 6, the general characteristics of
the percentage changes can be determined. For example, eight per cent of all returns
under Alternative B would be affected by less than one per cent; thirteen per cent
would be changed between on and five per cent or between minus one and minus
five per cent. The percentage which would be affected by five to ten per cent or
minus five to minus ten per cent would be fourteen per cent. Only thirty-five per cent
of all returns would experience a change in tax liability between minus ten per cent
and plus ten per cent. While twenty per cent of filers would incur an additional tax
of more than twenty per cent, twenty-five per cent would have a tax redtcction of
more than twenty per cent.
"f The flat rate of 15.4% was chosen in such a way that the total increase in tax is equal to the
total decrease in tax liability using Alternative B. The increase is (28,487,000) X ($272) = $7,748 million,
and the decrease is (41,734,000) X ($i86) = $7,762 million. The $14 million discrepancy is due to
rounding off of the flat rate and to the fact that the data set is not perfectly uniform in its composition
of different returns.
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TABLE 5
DSmrBUIoN OF RETURNS WITH INCREASED TAX LIABILITY UNDER ALTERNATIvE B,
BROAD TAx BASE AND A FLAT RATE OF 15.4 PER CENT
(Thousands)
Number of Returns Whose Tax liability Is 5 Average
Increased by: Total Tax
Number Increase
of per
Income Class $ 0-1% 1-5% 5-10% 10-20% 20%-ON Returns Return
0-600 ................... 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
600-1500 ................ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1500-3000 ............... 12 97 41 72 1123 1345 71
3000-5000 ............... 134 612 499 716 2967 4928 109
5000-7000 ............... 202 986 830 1064 3508 6590 133
7000-10000 .............. 307 1247 1075 1676 3904 8209 161
10000-15000 ............. 192 853 872 1089 1833 4839 222
15000-20000 ............. 83 206 257 313 454 1313 334
20000-25000 ............. 19 91 96 145 214 565 480
25000-50000 ............. 21 73 68 96 238 496 904
50000-100000 ............ 1 4 8 3 30 46 2332
100000-ON .............. 2 6 7 21 120 156 10490
TOTAL ................ 973 4175 3753 5195 14391 28487 272
Increase in Tax Revenue from These Returns =$7,748,000,000
TABLE 6
PROFILE OF CHANGES IN TAxEs (AS A PERCENTAGE OF PREvious TAXES) UNDER
ALTERNATIvE B, BROAD TAX BASE AND A FLAT RATE OF 15.4 PER CENT
Percentage of Returns Whose Change in Tax Liability Is: Total
Income - Number
Class -20% -10 to -5 to -ito 0to 0to Ito 5to 10 o 20% of Returns
$ -ON -20% -10% -5% -1% 1% 5% 10% 20% -ON (Thousands)
0-600 100 3782
600-1500 100 6792
1500-3000 76 8 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 12 9462
3000-5000 16 18 9 9 1 1 6 5 7 27 10321
5000-7000 4 8 11 7 2 2 10 8 11 36 9813
7000-10000 3 12 12 10 3 2 9 8 12 29 13615
10000-15000 5 19 15 10 3 2 8 9 11 18 10112
15000-20000 8 20 15 9 2 3 7 9 11 16 2895
20000-25000 9 21 11 9 3 2 8 8 12 18 1206
25000-50000 25 17 10 7 2 2 6 5 8 19 1251
50000-100000 60 7 7 4 0 0 2 4 1 14 209
100000-ON 32 5 2 2 1 1 2 2 8 46 263
TOTAL 25 12 9 7 7 1 6 5 7 20 70221
The over-all pattern of distribution of tax liability that results from Alternative B
is shown in Table 7. In the table we compare the "gainers" and "losers" by income
class. Gainers outnumber losers in most income classes. The total number of
returns which would benefit from Alternative B is 41.7 million (59.1 per cent of the
total) compared to 28.5 million returns (forty-one per cent of the total) which would
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TABLE 7
COMPARISON OF RETURNS WITH AN INCREASED TAX LIABILITY WITH THOSE WITH A
REDUCED TAX LIABILITY UNDER ALTERNATIVE B
Excess of Returns
Number of Returns (Thousands) with Increased
Taxes over Returns
with with with Reduced Taxes
Income Class $ Increased Taxes Reduced Taxes (Thousands)
0-600 ........................ 0 3782 -3782
600-1500 ..................... 0 6792 -6792
1500-3000 .................... 1345 8117 -6772
3000-5000 .................... 4928 5893 -965
5000-7000 .................... 6590 3223 3367
7000-10000 ................... 8209 5406 2803
10000-15000 .................. 4839 5273 -434
15000-20000 .................. 1313 1582 -269
20000-25000 .................. 565 641 -76
25000-50000 .................. 496 755 -259
50000-100000 ................. 46 163 -117
100000-ON ................... 156 107 49
TOTAL ...................... 28487 41734 -13247
lose under it. 4  Column 4 in Table 7 gives the net increase in the number of
returns with an increased tax liability. A negative figure in Column 4 indicates that
the number of returns with decreased tax liabilities is greater than the number of
returns with increased tax liabilities in that income class.
From Table 7 t is clear that taxpayers in all income classes, with the exception
of those in the $5000 to $7000, $7000 to $io,ooo, and $ioo,ooo and over brackets, gain
under Alternative B as compared to the existing tax structure. The net increase in
tax liability for the interval $5000 to $io,ooo, calculated from Tables 4 and 5, is $2.0
billion. On the other hand, there would be a net reduction of $1.9 billion in tax
liability for returns with incomes greater than $io,ooo (also calculated from Tables
4 and 5). This $1.9 billion net reduction is broken into a net reduction of $1.4
billion for the income interval $io,ooo to $iooooo, and a net reduction of $.5 billion
for the income class $ioo,ooo and above.'
The net gain for returns with incomes less than $5ooo is $.i billion. Some 6.3
million returns with income less than $5ooo whose tax liability increased generate
an additional $.6 billion in taxes, whereas the 24.6 million returns in this income class
with decreased taxes receive a total tax reduction of $.7 billion.
If all returns with incomes less than $i5oo or greater than $iooooo are excluded,
approximately fifty-two per cent of the returns remaining would show a reduction
in tax liability. 6 It is also interesting to note that the average decrease in the tax,
"The data in Table 7 came from the "Total" columns in Tables 4 & 5 supra.
"Note that the number of returns with increased tax liability is some 50% greater than the number
of returns with decreased taxes for the income class $Soo,ooo and up. However, the net change in
tax liability favors those with a reduction in taxes. The increase in tax for this income class is (I56,00o)
X ($16,49 6) =$2.6 billion. The decrease in tax for the same income class is (,07,000) X ($28,902)
$3.1 billion. So, the net change in tax for the $ioo,ooo and up income class is --$.5 billion.
2' The income classes $o-$6oo and $6oo-$,5oo should be left out since the tax decrease per return
LAw AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
for those with decreased taxes, is $i29, and the average increase in tax for returns
with increased taxes is $183 for returns with incomes greater than $15oo but less
than $100,000.
Alternative B is undoubtedly a better tax system than Alternative A. It may also
be considered an improvement over the existing tax structure for it moves closer
to the the goal of horizontal equity in taxation. For every income class, whether
gainers have exceeded losers or vice-versa, Alternative B treats more equally taxpayers
in equal circumstances than does the existing (1966) tax structure. Taxpayers who
lose under Alternative B clearly lose because Alternative B eliminates the built-in
preferences in the 1966 law for income derived from certain sources.
In short, horizontal equity is improved in every income class, by definition.
When we add to this the fact that the number of gainers exceeds the number of
losers, Alternative B is more attractive, for reasons of both equity and politics, than
either Alternative A or the existing system.
C. Alternative C
Using the same base as that used under Alternative B (including the low income
allowance), the graduated rate structure which is needed to raise the 1966 tax revenue
is a simple one with a maximum rate of forty per cent. Table 8 gives the marginal
rate structure which we linked to the data by income class.
TABLE 8
A GRADUATED TAX RATE OF Io%-40%
Tax Base Marginal Rate
0-10,000 .10
10,000-15,000 .15
15,000-25,000 .21
25,000-50,000 .30
50,000-ON .40
Tables 9 and io show the total number of returns which would lose or gain
under Alternative C. Had Alternative C been employed in place of the 1966 tax code,
approximately 62 million returns would have been better off and only 8.5 million
would have been worse off. The average dollar decrease in tax liability per return
with a decreased liability would have been $24. while the average increase per return
with an increased liability would have been $1700,
It is interesting to note that for income classes of $io,ooo and less, 57 million
returns show a decreased tax liability as against only 7 million returns with increased
tax liability. The average decrease in liability per return is $183 as compared to
$124 for returns with a tax increase.
in these classes is negligible. In fact, it is zero for the class $o-$6oo, and only $x6 for the class $6oo-
$1500.
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Table ii gives the total number of gainers and losers if Alternative C had been
implemented in 1966. From Table ii it is clear that under Alternative C more
returns would have had decreased tax liabilities for the tax base up to $25,ooo. Tax
returns with a tax base over $25,ooo would, on the whole, have had increased tax
liabilities.
Of particular interest is the fact that, although the highest marginal rate used
in the graduated structure is forty per cent, those with high incomes pay more taxes
under this system than under our present tax system with a top rate of seventy per
cent. This is due to the fact that the tax base used here is broader than the present
income tax base, thus disallowing exclusions or otherwise preferential treatment
awarded to those in higher marginal brackets. Clearly the graduated marginal
TABLE 9
DISTRBUTION OF RETURNS WITH INCREASED TAX LIABILITY UNDER ALTERNATIVE C,
BROAD TAX BASE AND A GRADUATED RATE OF I0o-40%*
(Thousands)
Total $
Number of Returns Whose Tax Liability Is Increased by: Number Average
of Increase
Income Class $ 0-1% 1-5% 5-10% 10-20% 20o-ON Returns Per Return
0-10000 ...... 164 536 415 684 4953 6752 124
10000-15000 ...... 15 30 38 35 239 357 463
15000-20000 ...... 18 31 23 45 101 218 448
20000-25000 ...... 2 33 22 28 82 167 691
25000-50000 12 73 76 156 372 689 1545
50000-100000 ..... 1 6 7 13 58 85 5329
100000-ON ....... .4 1 2 2 193 198 59000
TOTAL .......... 212.4 710 583 963 5998 8466 1703
See Table 8.
TABLE io
DISTRBUTION OF R -RNs WITH DECRVASED TAX LIABILIT UNDER ALTERNATIVE C,
BROAD TAx BASE AND A GRADUATED RATE OF Io%40o%*
(Thousands)
Total S
Number of Returns Whose Tax Liability Is Decreased by: Number Average
of Decrease
Income Class $ 0-1% 1-5% 5-10% 10-20% 20%-ON Returns Per Return
0-10000 ...... 113 668 989 2668 52160 56598 183
10000-15000 ...... 10 51 79 307 2818 3265 662
15000-20000 ...... 19 63 112 335 650 1179 659
20000-25000 ...... 9 37 48 110 163 367 843
25000-50000 ...... 15 58 48 59 75 255 1292
50000-100000 ..... 1 8 17 17 24 67 3927
100000-ON....... .3 2 2 7 13 24 30998
TOTAL .......... 167 887 1295 3503 55903 61755 242
See Table S.
LAw AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
TABLE ii
GAINERS, LOSERS, AND NET POSITION UNDER ALTERNATIVE C,
BROAD TAX BASE AND A GRADUATED RATE op 1o%-4o%*
Excess of Returns
Number of Returns (Thousands) With Reduced
Taxes Over Returns
with with With Increased Taxes
Income Class $ Increased Taxes Reduced Taxes (Thousands)
0-40000 .......................... 6752 56598 -40846
10000-15000 ......................... 357 3265 -2903
15000-20000 ......................... 218 1179 -961
20000-25000 .......................... 167 367 -200
25000-50000 .......................... 689 255 434
50000-100000 ......................... 85 67 18
100000-ON .......................... 198 24 174
TOTAL ............................. 8466 61755 -53289
See Table 8.
rate structure used here, when coupled with a broad tax base, is more progressive
and achieves more equity in the distribution of the tax burden than the existing
(1966) tax rate structure.
IV
IMPLICATIONS FOR TAx REFORM DIscussIoN
After comparing the existing income tax base and rate structure to the three hypo-
thetical tax systems examined in this paper, it is evident that the design of a tax
structure that broadens the base, coupled with a flat tax rate-if such a rate structure
is desired-must be envisaged with the differential incidence, class by class, of the
proposed and the old system in mind. From the data presented in this study, it
would appear that a broad tax base coupled with a low income allowance, elimina-
tion of itemizing, and a flat tax rate helps the majority of taxpayers. However,
it hurts more taxpayers in the $5ooo-to-$io,ooo and over-$Iooooo classes than it helps.
When a graduated rate structure of ten per cent to forty per cent is substituted
for the flat rate in Alternative B, more taxpayers in every income class up to
$25,000 are helped rather than hurt by it. The pattern of gainers and losers reported
in all cases obviously reflects the combination of items added to the base17 and
the specific pattern of deductions or allowances chosen. The alternatives suggested
here are dearly used for illustrative purpose only. However, it would be possible
to design a tax structure with a "broader" tax base, some form of low-middle income
allowance, and an appropriate rate structure, which would result in a different
pattern of distribution of gainers and losers. The distribution pattern resulting
from Alternative C is clearly more acceptable on equitable and moral grounds
17T he income items imputed to the tax base to arrive at the "broad" base in this study fall short
of those outlined in our definition. The items selected were those items for which data are presently
available. Estimations of other income items are presently under way.
BURDEN DISTIBUTION OF A BBOAD-BASED TAX
than the existing pattern of tax burden distribution. The important point, however,
is that a goal of taxation and the distribution of the tax bill must be made explicit
before designing any one particular tax system. If the tax system is to achieve
horizontal equity then it must be constructed in such a way as to eliminate all
preferences as to sources of income along the lines outlined in our broad base. When
the loss of "preferences" imposes a hardship on certain groups of taxpayers, one
should explicitly recognize whether the loss of "preferences" removes an already
existing inequity with respect to the equal treatment of equals or imposes some hard-
ship which the old tax system has been trying to alleviate on grounds other than equity
in taxation (for example, itemized deductions for extraordinary medical bills). In
the latter case one would argue that the tax system should not be used for this
purpose. A transfer scheme built into the tax system might be designed to achieve
such a purpose.
In summary, a properly defined income tax base is the first ingredient of any tax
reform package. The rate structure-whether a flat rate, or a progressive rate with
low income allowance or some other features (built-in transfers, for example)-could
be constructed to meet the desired goal of after-tax/transfer income distribution.
The appeal or lack of appeal of any new tax package, however, must ultimately rest
on the distributional pattern it would achieve as compared to the existing one and
on the extent such new patterns approximate the "desired" one.
